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1 October 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Edward Braswell re Fulbright
Amendment Problems

1. This afternoon I finally got through to Ed Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee, who had been tied up on the floor most of the day in connection with the passage of the Conference Report on the Military Procurement Authorization bill. I told him of the Director's appreciation for Chairman Stennis' call the other day and the Director's desire to see Stennis before the Director leaves next week on an overseas trip.

2. Braswell said he was confused about certain aspects of the matter. I said I couldn't speak for the Director but assumed he wanted to make sure that Chairman Stennis knew the effects which the Fulbright amendment, together with the congressional intent as explained by Stennis, would have on some going and planned programs in Southeast Asia.

3. Braswell said it was "a little late" to go into this now--that when the Fulbright amendment came up for consideration the Committee was unable to find out what programs the Administration had going in Southeast Asia, so they were in no position to argue against the Fulbright amendment. Braswell went on to say he must confess some irritation over the fact that we had provided details to our House Subcommittee but not to the Senate one, and this "looked like we were trying to split the Committees." I took issue with this, reminding Braswell that we had repeatedly made clear our readiness to appear whenever Stennis could find time for a hearing, and that the material we had provided Slatinshek on the House side had been furnished in response to his specific and urgent request for ammunition to help Chairman Rivers attack the Fulbright amendment in Conference. I went on to recount the history of our discussions with Russ Blandford and DOD representatives--General Lawrence, Maurice Lanman and later Fred Buzhardt. I said we had been under the distinct

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impression that DOD was going to raise the Fulbright amendment problems in their reclama but failed to do so, reportedly as a result of a last minute high level decision. I said we had had to rely on the DOD to raise the issue in the reclama because we couldn't afford to "get out in front" on this issue.




4. I suggested that the Pentagon's failure to go to bat on the Fulbright amendment might have been due to a top level assumption that the Agency could "take care of things" under its special authority. Braswell said he didn't think they were "that naive."

5. Braswell said he was afraid now that DOD was going to come up and "ask us to bail them out." I said I was afraid part of the problem was that some of the "people across the river" hadn't fully focused on the problem. Braswell said "some of those people" are not agreed on policy and are not concerned with legislation.

6. Braswell asked if we had had a "meeting of the minds" with DOD as to how the Fulbright amendment should be interpreted. I said we had discussed it but come to the conclusion that its precise effect on some of our programs in question was at least debatable. I said that for this very reason the Chairman's call to the Director had been particularly helpful, since it dispelled any uncertainty as to the congressional intent behind the amendment.

7. In conclusion Braswell and I agreed to meet tomorrow to discuss the matter in more detail so that Braswell can brief the Chairman prior to his meeting with the Director.

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 Legislative Counsel

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